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INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, the law concerning the rights of illegitimates has
undergone drastic changes. In the context of state intestate succession laws, these changes
have occurred primarily as a result of the United States Supreme Court decision in Trimble
v. Gordon This article is limited to the illegitimate’s right to acquire property by intestate
succession in Arkansas and focuses on the decisions of the United States Supreme Court,
the statutes of Arkansas before and after Trimble v. Gordon and the recent decisions of the
Arkansas Supreme Court.

As Arkansas has elected not to apply Trimble v. Gordon

retroactively, it is unlikely that the issue of the rights of bona fide purchasers will occur
frequently or except in unusual circumstances. Nevertheless, as the Arkansas Supreme
Court has indicated, the rights of bona fide purchasers might be considered in the proper
case.

Comments are included on this issue.

Although the decisions of the Arkansas

Supreme Court involving illegitimates decided prior to Trimble v. Gordon are not discussed,
a number of them are cited in the Footnotes, as these cases still represent good law on
questions of evidence.

It is hoped this article is of value to attorneys, landmen, title

examiners and others concerned with real estate in which the rights of illegitimates are
involved.
*Acknowledgment with appreciation is expressed to Michael G. Pond for his able work toward the preparation
of this paper. Mr. Pond is a third year law student at Mississippi College School of Law and a law clerk with
McDavid, Noblin & W est

COM M ON LAW BA C K G R O U N D

At common law an illegitimate child did not possess the right to inherit property.
He was regarded as filius nullius, or the child of no one.1 The common law rule regarding
illegitimate children was summarized by Professor Blackstone in his Commentaries on the
Laws of England wherein he stated:
I proceed next to the rights and incapacities which appertain to a bastard.
The rights are very few, being only such as he can acquire; for he can
inherit nothing, being looked upon as filius nullius, sometimes filius populi.
Yet he may gain a surname by reputation, though other children have a
settlement in their father’s parish; but a bastard in the parish where bom,
for he hath no father. . . [H]e cannot be heir to any one, neither can he
have heirs, but of his own body; for being nullius filius, he is therefore of
kin to nobody, and has no ancestor from which any inheritable blood can
be derived. . . A bastard may, lastly, be made legitimate, and capable of
inheriting, by the transcendent power of an act of parliament, and not otherwise.2

The common law treatment of illegitimates reflected the moral and social view that
illegitimate children were tainted and rightless beings that deserved nothing.3 In early
England, the social emphasis was on lineage which was traced through marriage which
publicly affirmed the ties between families.4 This emphasis on marriage left the child born
out of wedlock a misfit whose only hope was to marry and begin a family of his own.5
Legislative and judicial disfavor of illegitimate children has been slow to change. From the
era in early England until today, piecemeal legislation reflects a legislative reluctance to
enact protective legislation for illegitimate children.6 Through the late 1960s the most
significant statutory advances concerning illegitimate children, and their right to take
property by intestate succession, were maternal intestate succession laws and automatic
legitimation when the parents of an illegitimate child subsequently married.7 Most states
still failed to give illegitimate children the right to inherit from their fathers in the absence
of a will and some states even limited the father’s power to devise to an illegitimate
child.8 However, in 1968, illegitimate children finally secured constitutional protection.9
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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
CONCERNING INHERITANCE BY ILLEGITIMATES
The first case dealing with the rights of illegitimate children to acquire property by
intestate succession was Labine v. Vincent10 decided in 1971. In Labine, the United States
Supreme Court upheld a Louisiana statute that prevented an illegitimate child from sharing
in the estate of her father on an equal basis with legitimate children even though the father
had publicly acknowledged that the child was his own.11

Under Louisiana law, an

illegitimate child who had been publicly acknowledged by the father as his natural child
could only inherit to the exclusion of the State.12 In upholding the Louisiana statute, the
majority based its decision upon deference to the state’s right to regulate property
distributions holding that "the choices reflected by the intestate succession statute are
choices which it is within the power of the state to make".13 The majority noted that the
legislative purpose behind the Louisiana statute was "[t]o further strengthen and preserve
family ties".14 The majority did not apply a traditional equal protection analysis to the
statute, stating in a footnote that "[e]ven if we were to apply the ‘rational basis’ test to the
Louisiana intestate succession statute, that statute clearly has a rational basis in view of
Louisiana’s interest in promoting family life and of directing the disposition of property left
within the State".15 The majority also relied heavily upon the finding that Louisiana statute
had not created an "insurmountable barrier" to an illegitimate child’s ability to inherit from
her father.16 The father of the illegitimate child could have provided for her in a will, he
could have legitimated her by marrying her mother, or he could have stated in his acknowledgement of her paternity that he wished to legitimate the child, thus entitling her to
inherit property by intestate succession as any other legitimate child could have.17
The four dissenting justices, speaking through Justice Brennan, argued that to
disfavor illegitimate children in intestate distributions was irrational and in violation of the
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Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.18 The Louisiana statute imposed
an arbitrary burden upon illegitimate children because of their status over which they have
no control and "‘punish[ed] innocent children for the fault of their parents’".19
The dissenters did, however, recognize that a state might have an interest in "requiring
people to go through certain formalities in order to eliminate complicated questions of
proof and the opportunity for both error and fraud in determining paternity after the death
of the father".20 The dissenters would have held that the Louisiana statute was unconstitutional since the father had gone through a state authorized formality for declaring paternity.21 There was no difficulty of proof and no opportunity for fraud or error.22
On April 26, 1977, the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in
the landmark case of Trimble v. Gordon.23 In Trimble, an illegitimate child who had been
supported by the father and openly acknowledged by him as his natural child, was excluded
from sharing in his father’s estate pursuant to § 12 of the Illinois Probate Act.24 There
had also been a circuit court order establishing the father’s paternity which entitled the
child to support payments.25 Since, however, the child’s parents had never married, as
required by the Illinois statute, she could not share in her father’s estate.26
The United States Supreme Court held that the Illinois statute was unconstitutional.27 Justice Powell, speaking for the majority, found that § 12 of the Illinois
Probate Act was not a reasonable way of promoting the state’s interest in "encouraging
family relationships and in establishing an accurate and efficient method of disposing of
property at death".28 Although the majority did not term illegitimacy a "suspect class",29
thereby subjecting the statute to strict scrutiny, the majority noted that "‘[illegitimacy]
classifications approach sensitive and fundamental personal rights’".30 The Court, however,
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applied a "stricter scrutiny" than it would have applied to statutes involving economic and
social regulation.31
As to the asserted state interest in "‘the promotion of [legitimate] family relationships’", the majority stated that "§ 12 bears only the most attenuated relationship to the
asserted goal"32 and that "the Equal Protection Clause requires more than the mere
incantation of a proper state purpose".33 Even though the state’s interest in preserving and
promoting the family unit was a legitimate state interest, the majority impressed that "a
State [cannot] attempt to influence the actions of men and women by imposing sanctions
on the children born of their illegitimate relationships".34 Placing such burdens "‘on the
head of an infant is illogical and unjust. . . [and] contrary to the basic concept of our
system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or
wrongdoing’".35 The Court conclusively held that promoting marriage and encouraging
family relationships (or discouraging promiscuity) is not a sufficiently substantial governmental interest to uphold an illegitimacy classification in the intestacy context against an
equal protection challenge.
The majority did, however, recognize that the State’s interest in "‘establish[ing] a
method of property distribution’" offered a "more substantial justification" for the statute,36
stating that:
The more serious problem s o f proving paternity might justify a more demanding
standard fo r illegitimate children claiming under their father's estates than
required either fo r illegitimate children claiming under their m other's estates or
fo r legitimate children generally, (emphasis added) We think, however, that
the Illinois Supreme Court gave inadequate consideration to the relation
between § 12 and the State’s proper objective of assuring accuracy and
efficiency in the disposition of property at death. The court fa iled to consider
the possibility o f a m iddle ground between the extremes o f com plete exclusion and
case-by-case determ ination o f paternity ,37 (emphasis added)

The majority realized that the states have primary responsibility in the area of
disposition of intestate property within state boundaries, but the Illinois statute in question
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had created an "impenetrable barrier’"38 to an illegitimate child’s right to share in the
father’s estate. Although the majority recognized that allowing illegitimates to inherit from
or through their fathers would create problems of proof of paternity, the Court held that
"difficulties of proving paternity in some situations do not justify the total statutory disinheritance of illegitimate children whose fathers die intestate".39
The majority dispensed with the argument that the Illinois statute did not create an
"insurmountable barrier" to an illegitimate child’s ability to share in her father’s estate by
stating that "this analysis loses sight of the essential question:

the constitutionality of

discrimination against illegitimates in a state intestate succession law",40 and that "[h]ard
questions cannot be avoided by a hypothetical reshuffling of the facts",41 noting that if the
decedent had left a will or had married the illegitimate child’s mother the case would have
never come before the Court.42 In other words, the statute was unconstitutional on its face.
Finally, in support of the Illinois statute, it was argued that the law "mirror[ed] the
presumed intentions of the citizens" and that it should be presumed that the decedent
knew how his property would be disposed of under the intestacy statute. His failure to
make a will reflected his approval of the state’s scheme of intestate distribution.43 The
majority recognized that this argument had some "superficial appeal"44 but that the law
was not enacted for that purpose.45 In the history of the Illinois act the Court found a
"primary purpose [of] provid[ing] a system of intestate succession more just to illegitimate
children than prior law, a purpose tempered by a secondary interest in protecting against
spurious claims of paternity".46 The majority refused to "hypothesize an additional state
purpose that [was] ignored by the [court below]".47 The Court did not, however, overrule
Labine, probably because the Louisiana statute had created different subclasses of
illegitimates with different rights.48
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The four dissenters found Trimble constitutionally indistinguishable from Labine. 49
Rehnquist would have upheld the Illinois law on the grounds that the statute was
conceivably related to the asserted state interests and that a federal court should not
second-guess legislative judgment in an area traditionally reserved to the states, especially
since illegitimacy classifications had never been held "suspect".50
The next case decided by the United States Supreme Court involving a states’
scheme of intestate succession which contained classifications that failed to treat legitimate
and illegitimate children equally was Lalli v. L a lli51 decided in 1978. In L a lli, the Court
upheld a New York statute which required an illegitimate child to present "an order of
filiation declaring paternity" from a court of "competent jurisdiction... during the lifetime
of the father".52 Although the illegitimate offered evidence of his relationship with his
father, including a notarized document wherein the decedent referred to the child as "my
son", as well as affidavits that indicated the decedent’s acknowledgement of paternity,53
the Court upheld the New York statute and excluded the illegitimate children from sharing
in the intestate’s estate.54
The majority distinguished Trimble, first, on the ground that the single requirement
under § 4-1.2 (that paternity be established during the father’s lifetime) was an evidentiary
one, noting that the illegitimate child in Trimble would have inherited under the New York
statute.55 The declaration of paternity in Louisiana that entitled the child to support
payments would have met the evidentiary requirement imposed by § 4-1.2. Under the New
York law the marital status of the parents was irrelevant.56
Another distinction involved the state interest asserted in justification of the Illinois
statute that was struck down in Trimble. 57 Whereas Illinois defended its statute on the
ground that it encouraged legitimate family relationships, no such justification was offered
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in favor of the New York law.58 Instead, as the majority recognized, "[t]he primary state
goal underlying the challenged aspects of § 4-1.2 is to provide for the just and orderly
disposition of property at death,"59 and that the disposition of property at death "is an area
with[in] which the states have an interest of considerable magnitude".60 The majority felt
that the state’s interest was directly advanced by the statute "because of the peculiar
problems of proof that are involved in the context of paternal inheritance by illegitimate
children".61 The Court stated that:
Proof o f paternity. .. frequently is difficult when the father is not part o f a form al
fam ily unit. (emphasis added) The putative father often goes his way
unconscious of the birth of a child. Even if conscious, he is very often
totally unconcerned because of the absence of any ties to the mother.
Indeed the mother may not know who is responsible for her pregnancy.62

The majority also gave some meaningful deference to the legislative judgement that
led to the enactment of the New York statute since the problems of proof associated with
paternity in the context of intestate succession had been the subject of a comprehensive
study by "individuals experienced in the practical problems" of estate administration".63
These "practical problems" included: due process concerns (notice to unknown illegitimates), the finality of judgments in probate proceedings, and, of course, the stability of
land titles.64
"Because of the particular problems of proof, spurious claims might be difficult to
expose" and the New York statute considered in Lalli "sought to protect ‘innocent adults
and those rightfully interested in their estates from fraudulent claims of heirship and
harassing litigation instituted by those seeking to establish themselves as illegitimate
heirs’".65 The state’s interests were referred to by the court as being "substantial".66
Upon finding that the state’s interest was substantial the majority then tested the
means adopted by the state to advance the asserted state interests,67 noting that, the
"requirement [of an order of filiation declaring paternity during the father’s lifetime was]
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designed to ensure the accurate resolution of claims of paternity and to minimize the
potential for disruption of estate administration" and that "[a]ccuracy is enhanced by placing
paternity disputes in a judicial forum during the lifetime of the father".68 Furthermore, the
majority stated, the requirement "permits a man to defend his reputation against ‘unjust
accusations in paternity claims’, which was a secondary purpose of § 4-1.2"69 Since this
"procedural prophylactic"70 was "sufficiently related to the State’s interest in ‘the orderly
settlement of estates and the dependability of titles to property passing under intestacy
laws’" the New York law requiring an adjudication of paternity during the lifetime of the
father was upheld.71
The legislative history of the statute indicated that the legislature had "desired to
grant to illegitimates in so far as practicable rights of inheritance on par with those
enjoyed by legitimate children’"72 and the New York statute "represent[ed] a carefully
considered legislative judgement as to how this balance [between competing interests] could
be achieved".73 It was not necessary for the state to employ the means least restrictive to
the rights of illegitimate children.74
Four justices, speaking through Brennan, would have found the state’s interest
adequately served by a "‘formal acknowledgement of paternity’" and invalidated the New
York statute as violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
They felt that requiring an elevated standard of proof such as clear and convincing
evidence, would adequately serve the state’s interest while imposing a lesser burden on
illegitimate children.75
Reed v. Campbell76 is the most recent decision by the United States Supreme Court
dealing with the rights of illegitimate children to acquire property by intestate secession.
In R eed, the illegitimate’s father died intestate four months prior to the Court’s decision
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in Trimble.77 At the date of his death, § 42 of the Texas Probate Code precluded an
illegitimate child from sharing in the father’s estate unless the parents had subsequently
married.78 The lower court held that § 42 was applicable because Trimble did not apply
retroactively.79 The child’s parents had, in 1957, participated in a ceremonial marriage that
was invalid because the father’s divorce from his first wife was not final.80 His estate
remained open in February 1978 when the illegitimate notified the administratrix and the
probate court of her claim.81 She later filed a formal complaint. A jury established paternity but denied her claim because her parents were never validly married.82 On appeal she
claimed that she was entitled to inherit because Trimble rendered the Texas law unconstitutional and also that she should be legitimated on various theories.83 These arguments
were rejected by the Texas appellate court.84 The Texas Supreme Court refused to hear
her case, however, the United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and
reversed.
The United State Supreme Court began by stating that "we have unambiguously
concluded that a State may not justify discriminatory treatment of illegitimates in order to
express its disapproval of their parent’s misconduct... [although]... there is a permissible
basis for some ‘distinctions made in part on the basis of legitimacy”' 86 Citing L a lli, the
Court noted that it would uphold "statutory provisions that have an evident and substantial
relation to the State’s interest in providing for the orderly and just distribution of a
decedent’s property at death"87 The Court stated further that:
The state interest in the orderly disposition o f decedents estates (emphasis added)
may justify the imposition of special requirement upon an illegitimate child
who asserts a right to inherit from her father, and, of course, it justifies the
enforcement o f generally applicable lim itations on the tim e and the m anner in
which claim s m ay be asserted. After an estate has been finally d istrib u ted ,the
interest in finality m ay provide an additional, valid justification fo r barring the
belated assertion o f claim s, (emphasis added) even though mistakes of law
or fact may have occurred during the probate process.
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The Court held that the Texas court had erred in denying the illegitimate child’s
claim on the grounds that "(1) her father died before April 26,1977, and (2) her claim was
filed after April 26,1977" 89 noting that the Texas statute at issue had been held invalid by
the state’s courts where litigation was pending on the date that Trimble was handed
down.90 Because the intestate’s estate was still open when the illegitimate’s claim was
asserted, the state’s interest in the orderly administration of estates was not adversely
affected and "the interest in avoiding unjustified discrimination against children born out
of wedlock. . . should... have been given controlling effect".91 There were no dissenters
in this case.
In summarizing the current state of the law respecting the rights of illegitimates to
inherit property through intestate succession from a constitutional standpoint, it can be
seen that the interest in providing for the orderly administration of decedents’ estates (by
reducing the risk of error and the prevention of fraudulent and spurious claims, assuring
the finality of judgment in probate proceedings, and increasing the stability of titles) will
support legislation that regulates the time and manner in which illegitimates have to
present their claims even though legitimate and illegitimate children are treated unequally.
It certainly seems reasonable that time and manner restrictions might be considered a
necessity in the probate context, especially when the rights of innocent third parties might
be affected, however, given the decision in R eed , if the decedent’s estate has not been
finally closed these limitations may be unconstitutional.

ARKANSAS’ STATUTORY LAW
REGARDING THE EFFECT OF
ILLEGITIMACY ON INTESTATE SUCCESSION
Prior to the United States Supreme Court decision in Trimble v. Gordon ,92 Arkansas
law precluded an illegitimate child from sharing in his intestate father’s estate.
11

The

relevant statu te provided:
61-141. Illegitimate children - Concerning the effect of illegitimacy on
intestate succession:
(a) If the parents of a child shall have lived together as man and wife and,
before the birth of the child, shall have participated in a marriage ceremony
in apparent compliance with the law of the state where the marriage
ceremony was performed, though the attempted marriage be void, their child
is deemed to be the legitimate child of both parents for all purposes of
Intestate succession. A child bom or conceived during a marriage is
presumed to be the legitimate child of both spouses for the same purposes.
(b) If a man have a child or children by a woman, and afterward shall
intermarry with her, and shall recognize such child or children to be his,
such child or children shall be deemed and considered as legitimate.
(c) Any child conceived following artificial insemination of a married woman
with the consent of her husband shall be treated as their child for all
purposes of Intestate succession; consent of the husband is presumed unless
the contrary is shown by clear and convincing evidence.
(d) An illegitimate child or his descendants may inherit real or personal
property in the same manner as a legitimate child from such child’s mother
or her blood kindred; but such child may not inherit real or personal
property from his father or from his father’s blood kindred.
(e) Property of an illegitimate person passes in accordance with the usual
rules of Intestate succession to his mother and his kindred of her blood; but
the father of such person, or the blood kindred of such father, may not
inherit from the illegitimate child (or his descendants) either real or personal
property. [Acts 1969, No. 303, §11, p. 919.]93

After the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Trimble,
however, the Arkansas statute was amended to conform to the Court’s mandate concerning
the rights of illegitimate children to succeed to their father’s estates.94 The present statute
dealing with the effects of illegitimacy on intestate succession provides:
28-9-209. Legitimacy of child - Effect
(a) (1) If the parents of a child have lived together as man and wife and,
before the birth of their child, have participated in a marriage ceremony in
apparent compliance with the law of the state where the marriage ceremony
was performed, though the attempted marriage is void, their child is deemed
to be the legitimate child of both parents for all purposes of intestate
succession.
(2) A child bom or conceived during a marriage is presumed to be the
legitimate child of both spouses for the same purposes.
(b) If a man has a child or children by a woman, and afterward intermarries with her and recognizes the child or children to be his, the child or
children shall be deemed and considered legitimate.
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(c) Any child conceived following artificial insemination of a married woman
with the consent of her husband shall be treated as their child for all
purposes of intestate succession. Consent of the husband is presumed
unless the contrary is shown by clear and convincing evidence.
(d) An illegitimate child or his descendants may inherit real or personal
property in the same manner as a legitimate child from the child’s mother
or her blood kindred. The child may inherit real or personal property from
his father or from his father’s blood kindred provided that at least one (1)
of the following conditions is satisfied and an action is commenced or claim
asserted against the estate of the father in a court of competent jurisdiction
within one hundred eighty (180) days of the death of the father:
(1) That a court of competent jurisdiction has established the
paternity of the child or has determined the legitimacy of the child pursuant
to subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section; or
(2) That the man has made a written acknowledgment that he is
the father of the child; or
(3) That the man’s name appears with his written consent on the
birth certificate as the father of the child; or
child; or

(4) That the mother and father intermarry prior to the birth of the

(5) That the mother and putative father attempted to m any each
other prior to the birth of the child by a marriage solemnized in apparent
compliance with law, although the attempted marriage is or could be
declared invalid; or
(6) That the putative father is obligated to support the child under
a written voluntary promise or by court order.
(e) Property of an illegitimate person passes in accordance with the usual
rules of intestate succession to his mother and his kindred of her blood and
to his father and his kindred of his father’s blood, provided that paternity
has been established in accordance with subsection (d).
(f) Nothing contained in this section shall extend the time within which a
right of inheritance or a right to a succession may be asserted beyond the
time provided by law relating to distribution and closing dependents’ estates
or to the determination of heirship, or otherwise.95

ARKANSAS CASE LAW - CASES DECIDED
SUBSEQUENT TO TRIMBLE V. GORDON
Although the Arkansas Supreme Court did not have to review the constitutionality
of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 61-141 in Sims v. First National Bank o f Hot Springs96 because the
illegitimate child sought to inherit through maternal lines, this case is of value in that it
exemplifies the evidentiary requirements necessary to establish a claim.97 These evidentiary
13

elements were essentially the same under pre-Trimble decisions.98
In Sims , John B. Sims and Claire Lee Sims petitioned the court to be appointed
personal representatives of the estate of Claire Moore Sims.99 John B. Sims was listed as
an heir in this petition.100 After John B. Sims submitted two fraudulent wills for probate,
one of the heirs contested the fact that he was an heir at law.101 After he admitted that
the wills were fraudulent, the court appointed the First National Bank of Hot Springs as
administrator in succession.102 The trial court ruled that he was not an heir.103 Sims then
employed an attorney who obtained additional information, including a Texas birth
certificate which showed that a John Burkett, Jr. was born to a Clara Browning and a John
Burkett on January 7, 1932.104 The trial court, as permitted by Ark. Stat. Ann. § 22-406.4
(Supp. 1977), within 90 days set aside its first order and scheduled a second hearing to
consider the additional evidence.105 The court then found that John B. Sims was the
illegitimate son of Claire Moore Sims and thus entitled to share in her estate.106
The testimony showed that, until their divorce in 1930, the decedent was married to
D. O. Sims and to this union four children were born.107 It was agreed by all of the
witnesses that John B. Sims was about two years old when he came to Hot Springs to live
with the decedent, who raised him as one of her children.108 They also agreed that Claire
Moore Sims had met someone on the highway outside of Hot Springs and that John B.
Sims was handed to her through a car window.109 She referred to him as "John Bentley"
and he did not go by the name Sims until he started school.110 It was also undisputed that
a sixteen year old boy named Joseph A. Seyl came to live with the decedent following the
1930 divorce.111 John B. Sims claimed to be the illegitimate child of Claire Moore Sims
and Joseph A. Seyl.112
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A family friend testified that she knew that the decedent had become pregnant and
moved away to have a child and upon her return she told the witness that she had a son
that she had named "Johnnie".113
The decedent’s sister also testified that following the 1930 divorce, Claire Moore
Sims became pregnant at the age of 34 and left Hot Springs to have the child.114 She also
testified that the decedent told her that she had named the child after their cousin John
Burkett, that Seyl had left town with her sister, and that Claire Moore Sims told her that
Seyl was the father of her child. 115
The other heirs at law of Claire Moore Sims appealed arguing that, because it had
been determined that the decedent’s signature on the birth certificate was forged, the birth
certificate was irrelevant.116 The Arkansas Supreme Court, however, ruled that "[t]he least
effect the birth certificate had was to render testimony of [the decedents’ sister] more
probable within the meaning of the definition of relevancy".117 The appellants also argued
that the trial court erred in setting aside its first order, however, the Arkansas Supreme
Court dispensed with this argument as being "without merit" citing Ark. Stat. Ann. § 22406.4 (Supp. 1977).118 The appellants’ final argument was that the evidence was insufficient
to support the trial courts’ findings.119 The court stated that the evidence was sufficient
and that the testimony of the decedent’s sister alone "would almost compel the conclusion
reached by the trial court". 120 The testimony of interested witnesses could be discounted
and no one had questioned the appellee’s status as an heir at law prior to the dispute
concerning the fraudulent wills.121

In Brown v. Danlej122the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the statutory presumption
that a child born during wedlock is the legitimate child of both spouses, and the rule of
evidence which excludes testimony by a parent that tends to bastardize a child, against a
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challenge that the presumptions and rules of evidence discriminate against black persons
by making it more difficult for them to prove paternity, thereby denying them equal
protection.123
In this case John W. Brown (Jr.) was born four and a half months after the marriage
of John W. Brown (Sr.) and his mother, Inez Hall.124 Brown (Jr.), however, claimed to be
the illegitimate son of the deceased Henry Smiley, who died intestate in 1976 leaving a
substantial estate.125 Smiley had been married from 1910 until his wife’s death in 1965.126
Brown was born in 1937.127 He claimed that he was entitled to the decedent’s entire
estate.128
The Arkansas Supreme Court first recognized that Ark. Stat. Ann. §61-141(a)(Repl.
1971)129 creates "a statutory presumption that a child born during a marriage is the
legitimate child of both spouses".130 The statutory presumption reflects the same presumption that existed at common law and "continues until it is overcome by the clearest proof
that the husband was impotent or was without access to his wife during the time the child
might have been conceived".131

The court did state, however, that "the common law

presumption may be weaker when the child was conceived before the marriage".132
The testimony by Brown’s mother that Smiley was his father and that she had not
had sexual relations with John W. Brown (Sr.) prior to the appellant’s birth was excluded
"under [the] settled rule that parents cannot bastardize a child born in wedlock by testifying to their own nonaccess to one another".133 There was no other evidence offered that
the putative father was impotent or that he had no access to the appellant’s mother when
the child might have been conceived.134
The court recognized that a statute similar to § 61-141(d) was held unconstitutional
in Trimble v. Gordon135 Since the court would have reached the same conclusion in this
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case whether or not the Arkansas statute was constitutional, the court did not pass upon
the constitutionality of the Arkansas law which prohibited illegitimates from inheriting from
their fathers.136 The argument that the presumptions and rules of evidence discriminated
on the basis of race was without merit; the challenged rules rests upon "sound principles
of public policy" and "color has nothing to do with it".137
In Lucas v. Handcock ,138 the Arkansas Supreme Court held that Ark. Stat. Ann.
§61-141 (Repl. 1971) was unconstitutional in light of the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Trimble v. Gordon ,139 noting that "[t]he statutes are so nearly identical
in effect that it cannot be seriously argued that one can meet equal protection standards
and the other not" and that "[t]here is no way by which our statute can be distinguishable
from the statute involved in Trimble , so as to meet the equal protection requirements
applied in Trimb le".14°
Although the probate judge below had attempted to distinguish this case from
Trimble on the facts by stating that the relationship between the mother and father in the
Trimble case was "substantial", whereas in this case the relationship was a "casual" one,141
the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that "[t]he United States Supreme Court held [the
statute considered in Trimble ] unconstitutional on its face".142 The factual background of
this case was important in determining that the appellant had standing by "‘alleg[ing] such
a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which [the] court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions’".143 Since the appellant met the "Baker"
test he had standing.
The court also recognized that the Arkansas legislature had passed the emergency
clause of Act 1015 of 1979, by which Ark. Stat. Ann. §61-141 (d) was amended, in an effort
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to meet the constitutional mandates of Trimble and expounded on in L a lli.144 Since,
however, there was no express declaration or necessary implication from the language used,
Act 1015 could not be applied retroactively.145 The Arkansas Supreme Court opted for a
"clear and convincing" standard of proof of paternity, which was met by the appellant, and
allowed the illegitimate to share in the father’s estate.146
The "clear and convincing" evidence that led the court to hold that the requisite
degree of proof was met consisted of a birth certificate that showed the decedent to be the
appellant’s father, the fact that the appellant had used the decedent’s surname all his life,
the appellant’s testimony that he had always called the decedent "daddy" and that the
decedent called him "son", the decedent had provided him with food and clothing and took
him places, and the appellant lived with the decedent during summer months and on
weekends.147 Furthermore, in the administratrix’s verified petition for appointment the
appellant was listed as an heir at law of the decedent and his relationship to the decedent
was stated to be "grandson".148 The appellant was the beneficiary of the decedent’s life
insurance policy and administrator over his insurance.149 The court referred to this evidence
as "clear, cogent and convincing" and "overwhelming".150
In Frakes v. Hunt ,151 the Arkansas Supreme Court decided that Trimble v.
Gordon152 would not be applied retroactively to affect the descent of property occurring
upon the intestate’s death in 1972.153 The court recognized that a retroactive application
of the Trimble decision "[would create] a title problem that could materially hamper the
improvement of property". 154 Quoting extensively from the appellant’s brief, the opinion
recites:
Appellant recognizes that if Ark. Stat Ann.
§61-141 (d) is declared
unconstitutional the court will be required, in some cases, to enunciate rules
that will protect those persons who have relied upon the statute. In som e
cases, equity and justice will require exception to permitting inheritance by
illegitimates where heirs or bona-fide purchasers fo r value have acted in reliance
on a justified assum ption that no illegitimate exists. (emphasis added) 155
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The appellant in this case argued that, since no bona-fide purchasers were involved
and there had been no reliance by the heirs of the decedent upon the non-existence of an
illegitimate, the holding in Trimble should apply.156 The court, however, held that where
the rights of inheritance had finally vested 157 Trimble would not apply retroactively. This
was a necessity, the court reasoned, in order "to prevent chaotic conditions arising from the
lack of a title to real property".158
Justice Fogleman dissented vigorously arguing that the Arkansas Supreme Court did
not have the authority to determine whether or not the holding in Trimble should be
applied retroactively; that determination being one for the United States Supreme Court.159
He felt that Trimble should be applied retroactively until the United States Supreme Court
held otherwise and that the case should have been remanded to the trial court for a
determination of whether or not the appellant had met the "clear and convincing" standard
of proof of paternity since no bona-fide purchaser’s rights were involved.160
Compton v. White 161 involved an appeal from a Jefferson County Probate Court
decree which granted three illegitimate children the right to inherit from their father. The
probate judge had ruled that Ark. Stat. Ann. §61-141(d), which prevented an illegitimate
child from inheriting from his father, as well as the common law rule to the same effect,
was unconstitutional and applied Trimble retroactively.162
While this case was pending on appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court decided Lucas
v. H andcock163 and Frakes v. H unt164 which resolved all issues in this case.165 Adhering
to their decision in Lucas, the court agreed that Ark. Stat. Ann. §61-141(d) was unconstitutional.166 Since, however, in Frakes the court had decided that Trimble would not be
applied retroactively, the decision of the probate court was reversed.167

Where the

decedent passed away prior to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Trimble and
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the pleadings in this case were not filed until after the Trimble decision, the appellee’s
claim could not prevail.170
It is worth noting that the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain the finding
that the appellees were the natural children of the decedent.169

The decedent had

acknowledged that the children were his own and had set up a separate savings account for
each child.168 Furthermore, this evidence was "virtually undisputed".171
In Ford v. K ing, 172 the putative heirs of Rafe Ford, who died in 1928, intervened
in a partition suit claiming that they were entitled to a share in the proceeds arising from
the sale of 200 acres of land in Union County.173 The land had been in the possession of
some of Ford’s descendants for 50 years until March 1978 when nine of his descendants
brought suit for partition and a determination of heirship. 174 In May, the court entered
a decree determining heirship and ordering a partition sale.175 In June, the appellants
herein intervened, claiming that they too were descendants of Rafe Ford.176

Their

intervention was dismissed in February 1979 and this appeal ensued.177
The Arkansas Supreme Court rejected the appellant’s claim based upon illegitimacy
stating that "[i]n 1928, there could be no inheritance by an illegitimate child with respect
to the estate of the father".178 Even though the rule was held unconstitutional in Trimble,
"that decision was not retroactive except as to litigation pending on April 26, 1977, the
date of the decision".179 This case was not pending on that date.180
The appellants also claimed that their mother, Susie Ford, was the legitimate
daughter of Rafe Ford, arguing that Susie’s mother was married to Ford and lived with him
for many years.181 There was, however, no proof to support the assertion. 182
The appellant’s final argument was that Susie Ford was the illegitimate child of Rafe
Ford, but was legitimated when Ford acknowledged her as his child.183 Under Ark. Stat.
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Ann. §61-141(b) if a man and woman had a child and subsequently intermarried, and he
recognizes the child as his own, the child is considered to be legitimate.184 Three witnesses
testified that Ford had said that Susie was his daughter, however, two gave no persuasive
details to support Ford’s statement and the other witness’ testimony was discounted because
he was an interested party.185
The appellants also introduced a marriage license into evidence that showed that
Ford married Sylvia Furlough in 1900, when he was 41 and she was 39, which meant that
Sylvia was born in 1861.186 They also introduced a marriage license showing that Susie
Ford was 18 when she was married in 1892.187

These two documents read together meant

that Sylvia would have been 13 when Susie was born which the court referred to as "a
possibility but certainly not a probability".188 The appellees also presented a marriage
license showing that Susie Ford was 18 when she married a different man in 1885.189 This
would have meant that Sylvia was only six years old when Susie was born.190 The court
stated that "[t]he record leaves some doubt about whether Sylvia was Susie’s mother".191
The court held that the appellant’s proof was "decidedly deficient"192 stating that:
In m ost cases presenting a sim ilar issue there is substantial proof o f the putative
father’s access to the m other or relationship with her, as by oral testimony, letters,
birth certificates, death certificates, marriage licenses or other evidence. . . .
(emphasis added) But here there is no proof that Rafe Ford even knew
Sylvia Furlough in 1874, 26 years before he married her, much less that at
the age of 15 he fathered a child.193

The court concluded that the appellant’s proof was "too far in the field of speculation".194
In Stewart v. Smith, 195 Ada Stewart, sister of the deceased Wesley Shaw, Sr.,
challenged the appellate court’s affirmance of an appointment of a personal representative
for the estate of Shaw, granted pursuant to the appellee’s petition for appointment filed
on December 1, 1975.196 The appellee listed himself as the "son" of Wesley Shaw, Sr. and
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also listed as grandchildren the infant children of petitioner Smith’s decedent.197 Ada
Steward raised the question of their legitimacy and asserted that any claim by petitioner
Smith’s decedent and petitioner Shaw "’derives solely from their status as alleged illegitimate children and or descendants of such illegitimate children of the decedent’.
. . [and th a t].. . the personal representative, appointed at the request of petitioner Shaw,
‘is the nominee of persons whose interest in this litigation is adverse to petitioner both in
theory and in fact’".198
The Arkansas Supreme Court, in affirming the Court of Appeals’ decision, held that,
as of the date of the decision in Trimble v. Gordon ,199 "litigation was pending as to the
right of petitioners to inherit as illegitimate descendants of the decedent".200
In Wright v. Vales ,201 the appellants claimed to be the illegitimate children of Moses
Wright who died on December 31, 1977.202 The administratrix, in her response to their
petition, acknowledged that the appellants were the illegitimate children of Moses
Wright.203 The probate court had excluded them from sharing in Wright’s estate however,
finding the appellants to be the lawful children of Precious and Earnest Davis.204
In 1945 the appellants’ mother married Earnest Davis in a ceremonial wedding
performed by a minister.205 The appellants’ mother, Precious Davis, testified that she and
Davis permanently separated in 1946 and that she and Moses Wright had a relationship
from 1947 until 1949, during which time the appellants were born.206
The trial court, in reaching the conclusion that the appellants were the legitimate
children of Precious and Earnest Davis, relied on the presumption that a child born in
wedlock is legitimate.207 The testimony of Precious Davis, that her husband had no access
to her during the period in which the appellants were conceived, was excluded.208
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court on both points,
stating that "[t]he presumption of legitimacy of children born during the wedlock of two
22

persons is well grounded in common law and Arkansas statutory law".209 Furthermore, "a
parents’ testimony is incompetent when it is employed to bastardize a child".210
The appellants also argued that there never was a legal marriage between Precious
and Earnest Davis because there was no evidence that a marriage license was issued and
recorded as required by Arkansas law.211 The court responded by holding that "our
marriage license statutes are merely directory and not mandatory, a n d ... Arkansas has no
statute providing a marriage is void when no license is obtained".212
The appellants also contended that the legitimacy presumption should not apply
because the only proof in the record revealed that Precious and Earnest Davis had not
been together since 1946 and that the oldest appellant was not born until 1948.213 There
was also testimony that Moses Wright acknowledged himself as the father of the appellants.214 The court held that "this [evidence was] not sufficient to rebut the appellants’
legitimacy status" and that "the presumption of legitimacy rule can only be overcome by the
clearest evidence that the husband was impotent or without access to his wife".215 Since
there was no evidence that Earnest Davis was impotent and the only evidence of nonaccess
was the testimony of his wife, the appellants failed to rebut the presumption of legitimacy.216
In Lewis v. Petty, 217 the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the decision of the
Faulkner County Probate Court which found that Carmen Petty was the illegitimate
daughter of Major William Lewis.218 The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the
application of a "clear, cogent and convincing proof" standard was properly applied to the
question of whether Carmen Petty was the illegitimate daughter of the intestate decedent,
Major William Lewis, where the case arose between the court’s decision in Lucas v.
Handcock, 219 which declared Ark. Stat. Ann. § 61-141 unconstitutional under the authority
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of Trimble v. Gordon, 220 and the effective date of Act 1015 of 1979 which amended the
invalidated statute.221
The appellant in the instance case, collateral heirs of Major William Lewis, argued
that the appellee, Carmen Petty could not inherit from Lewis’ estate absent some form of
written acknowledgment by Major Lewis that the appellee was his daughter or a judicial
determination of parenthood during the lifetime of the parties.222 The Arkansas Supreme
Court held, however, that the evidence presented below met the "clear, cogent and
convincing proof" standard.223 There was testimony that Major Lewis had dated Carmen
Petty’s unwed mother (deceased) prior to Carmen Petty’s birth, Major Lewis was listed as
the father on her birth certificate, she was enrolled at school as Carmen Lewis, her
marriage license was issued to Miss Carmen Lewis, she was known throughout the small
community where she lived as Major Lewis’ daughter, there was testimony that Major
Lewis recognized her as his daughter and provided her with some financial support, there
was testimony that Carmen Petty referred to Major Lewis as "daddy" and that he asked
that her children be told that he was their grandfather, and Carmen Petty attended Major
Lewis’ funeral.224 There was also evidence of a similarity of appearance between Carmen
Petty and Major Lewis.225
The appellants also argued that testimony as to the general reputation in the
community on the issue of paternity should not have been allowed.226 The Supreme Court,
however, recognized that Arkansas’ Uniform Rules of Evidence, Ark. Stat. Ann. §28-1001
(Repl. 1979), Rule 803(19) provided a hearsay exception for "[r]eputation. . .

among

members of his family. . . or among his associates, or in the community, concerning a
person’s birth. . . relationship by blood. . . ancestry, or other similar fact of his personal
or family history" and that the witnesses were long-time residents of the small community
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where Carmen Petty was raised and they knew her mother and Major Lewis,227
The collateral heirs of Major Lewis also argued that the appellee’s birth certificate
should not have been admitted into evidence.228 The Arkansas Supreme Court disagreed
recognizing that Rule 803(9) of the Rules of Evidence provided a hearsay exception for
"records of data compilations, in any form, of b irth .. . or marriages, if the report thereof
was made to a public office pursuant to requirements of law".229 Since the birth certificate,
signed by Carmen Petty’s mother, which listed Major Lewis as Carmen’s father, had been
filed for record with the proper authorities 230 it was "prima facie evidence in all courts and
places of the facts therein stated".231 No challenge was made as to the authenticity of the
birth certificate.232
This case is important in that the case lists factors which, when taken together, will
allow an alleged illegitimate to meet the required "clear, cogent and convincing proof"
standard in establishing paternity.
In Allen v. Wallis,233 the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded an order
of the Van Buren Probate Court which found that the three children of Fletcher Haywood
Allen were not the lawful heirs of Allen’s deceased uncle, Wager Kirkwood.234 The
probate judge had based his decision on the premise that the appellant’s claim accrued
before the law was changed allowing illegitimates to inherit and that the appellants had to
prove that their parents were married by "clear, cogent and convincing evidence".235
The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed finding by a "preponderance of the evidence"
that the parents were married and that "the appellants were entitled to inherit through
their father pursuant to Ark. Stat. Ann. §61-141 (Supp. 1981).236 Although the appellants,
Oneta Allen, Fletcher Harold Allen and Dixie Aleta Marie Hamlin, could not produce a
marriage certificate, it was shown that their parents had lived together for approximately

25

seventeen years and had held themselves out as husband and wife.237 Part of this period
was spent in Texas, a state that recognizes common-law marriages.238 Fletcher Harold
Allen offered testimony that he never knew that his parents had never wed.239 All three
of the children’s birth certificates showed that Fletcher Allen was the father, two listing
"Mrs. Fletcher Allen" as the mother and one showing "Iva Allen" as the mother.240 Also,
Fletcher Allen once mailed Iva a card addressed to "Mrs. Fletcher Allen" in Indiana, a
state which also recognizes common-law marriages.241 A Clarksville, Arkansas newspaper
announcement announced the birth of Dixie Aleta Marie as the daughter of Mr. and Mrs.
Fletcher Allen.242
The probate judge also held that the appellants could not inherit as the illegitimate
children of Fletcher Haywood Allen under Ark. Stat. Ann § 61-141 since the Arkansas
Supreme Court had ruled in Frakes v. Hunt 243 that Trimble v. Gordon ,244 would not be
applied retroactively and Fletcher Allen had died in 1969 245 The Arkansas Supreme Court
held that this was incorrect since the appellants did not become the heirs of Allen’s uncle,
Wager Kirkwood until his death in 1979 after Trimble was decided.246 The court, however,
based its decision upon the fact that the Allens had a common-law marriage pursuant to
Texas law and also stated that "[w]here there is a cohabitation apparently matrimonial, a
strong presumption of marriage arises which increases with the passage of time. . .
especially where the legitimacy of a child is involved".247 The appellees had failed to
overcome this presumption by proving that there had not been a marriage.
In Henry v. Johnson ,248 the Arkansas Supreme Court held that "to the extent, if any,
that our prior decisions have implied that county courts have jurisdiction to determine
heirship, they are overruled".249 Although Article 7, Section 28, of the Arkansas Constitution grants exclusive jurisdiction to the county courts in all bastardy proceedings, the court
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held that "a determination of heirship is not a bastardy proceeding within the meaning of
Article 7, Section 28", and that "an illegitimate child may bring a petition for the determination of heirship in the probate court where the decedent’s estate is being administered".250 The court distinguished the type of bastardy proceeding where there is a
living putative father and a proceeding to determine heirship by the standard of proof
required in each type of action, "a preponderance of the evidence" will suffice in the
former, whereas the latter requires "clear and convincing evidence" of paternity.251 In the
instant case the appellant sought only to establish heirship in a probate court and she did
not attempt to establish liability for expenses, visitation right, or support payment.252 The
probate court erred in dismissing her claim for lack of jurisdiction.253
In Boatman v. Dawkins254 the Arkansas Supreme Court was asked to decide if Ark.
Code Ann.

§ 28-9-209 (1987) violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment.255 The Appellant in this case alleged that, because the statute provides that
an illegitimate child must file a claim against her father’s estate within 180 days of his
death, while a legitimate child has a longer period, the statute is invalid 256
In this case, Steve Holmes, the illegitimate’s father, died intestate on May 17,
1983.257 On May 31, 1983, the appellee filed a petition in probate court seeking to have
herself appointed personal representative of Holme’s estate.258 Kristy, the illegitimate child,
received no notice of the petition for probate.259 The appellee, Mable Dawkins, was
appointed administratrix on August 16,1983.260 On March 6,1986, the appellant, as mother
and next friend of Kristy, who was an infant, filed a petition in probate court to determine
heirship.261 A final order closing the estate had not been entered.262 The probate court
found that Kristy was the illegitimate child of Steve Holmes but, because she had not
asserted her claim within 180 days of his death, she could not inherit.263
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On appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court, the appellant argued that the differential
treatment of illegitimate children amounted to "unjustified discrimination". 264 The
Arkansas Supreme Court, however, gave deference to the Arkansas legislature, noting that
the state’s laws respecting illegitimates had been changed for the express purpose of
complying with the mandates of Trimblei265 The court cited L a lli, for the proposition that
the 180 day limitation on illegitimates seeking to inherit from their fathers was a reasonable time limitation and that in L a lli, "‘during the lifetime of the father’. . . was a constitutionally valid limitation on time.’"266 The court then held that "[o]bviously, the statute,
Ark. Code Ann. § 28-9-209 (1987). . . does not violate the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment".267
The appellant argued that the trial court should have applied Ark. Code. Ann. §
1-56-116 (1987) which allows a minor up to three years from the time he or she reaches
majority to assert an action but the court dispensed with this argument as being "without
merit".268
In support of the Arkansas law the court stated:
The probate statute giving an illegitimate child 180 days to file a claim is a statute
creating a new right, and the right is created fo r only 180 days. . . . (emphasis
added) The provisions requiring it to be asserted in a particular mode and
within a fixed time, are conditions and qualifications attached to the right
itself, and do not form a part of the law of the remedy. I f it is not asserted
within the perm itted period, it ceases to exist and cannot be claim ed or enforced
in any fo rm . (emphasis added)269

In other words, the provisions in Ark. Code Ann. § 28-9-209 (1987) created a new
right that did not exist at common law, the 180 day period formed part of that right,
therefore the 180 day limitation period was not typical statute of limitations.
The appellant’s final argument was that she was not given notice of the petition for
probate as required by Ark. Code Ann. § 28-40-111 (1987), and therefore the 180 day
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statute was inapplicable.270 The court, however, would not consider the argument because
it had not been properly raised below.271
Justice Hickman, Purtle, and Hays dissented. In a stinging dissent, Justice Purtle
argued that Arkansas statutory treatment of illegitimates violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth A m endm ent.272 The dissenting justice first stated additional facts
not set out in the majority opinion.
The appellee and administratrix, Mable Dawkins, was the mother of Steve
Holmes.273 She visited her granddaughter Kristy even after her son’s death 274 She gave no
notice to Kristy or her mother, the appellant, Hortense Boatman, of her petition for
appointment as administratrix of Holmes’ estate.275 Furthermore, when Kristy was born,
Hortense Boatman and Steve Holmes executed an affidavit in which Holmes acknowledged
that he was Kristy’s father.276 His name also appeared on Kristy’s birth certificate 277
Justice Purtle argued that, because no guardian or attorney ad litem was appointed
for the nine-month-old Kristy Holmes and no notice was given to her, she was deprived of
due process stating that "[e]ven if Ark. Code Ann. § 28-9-209 (1987) is constitutional, the
facts of the case require a different result than that reached by the majority".278 He felt,
however, that "Ark Code Ann § 28-9-209(1987)... is discriminatory on its face and should
be declared invalid,"279 stating that "[i]f prohibiting an illegitimate child from inheriting
from his father’s estate is not a proper state interest, then certainly limiting the right of
inheritance by illegitimate children cannot be justified on the same grounds".280
This case is difficult to square with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Reed. Here, as in R eed, the illegimate’s claim to share in her father’s estate was asserted
before the intestate’s estate was finally closed. The United States Supreme Court in Reed
allowed the illegimate’s claim where there had been no final order closing the estate and
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no innocent third party rights were implicated. In the Boatman case the state’s interest in
the finality of probate proceedings would not have been adversarily affected by a allowing
the illegitimate to share in the remaining estate.

Furthermore, the state’s interest in

preventing fraudulent and spurious claims, which led the United States Supreme Court to
uphold the statute in Lalli on the basis that the statue served an evidentiary function,
would not have been adversely affected by allowing the illegitimate child in the Boatman
case to inherit where it was certain that the decedent was the illegitimate’s father.

RIGHTS OF BONA FIDE PURCHASERS
The Arkansas Supreme Court has yet to decide a case involving the right of an
illegitimate child to inherit where the rights of an innocent purchaser for value are
implicated. The court has, however, indicated that the rights of the bona fide purchaser
who has relied on prior law will prevail. In Frakes v. H u n t281 the court recognized that
"[In some cases, equity and justice will require exception to permitting inheritance by
illegitimates where heirs or bona-fide purchasers for value have acted in reliance on a
justified assumption that no illegitimate exists". 282 Although the Arkansas Supreme Court
held that Trimble would not be given retroactive effect in Frakes and in Boatman v.
Dawkins 283 that Arkansas’ 180 day limitation on illegitimates for asserting claims is valid,
thus reducing the likelihood that a case will arise wherein the rights of a bona fide
purchaser are involved, this problematic area is worthy of note.
When a case with the same factual background as Boatman next arises it is almost
certain that the attorney representing the known illegitimate who hasn’t received notice
of the opening of his father’s estate will raise the due process issue that was not properly
presented in Boatman. Assuming that the illegitimate prevails, the 180 day limitation may
not be applicable. In this situation, third party reliance could likely be present.
30

A recent Mississippi case, Collier v. Shell Oil Co. 284 dealt with the issue of reliance
on pre-Trimble law by a bona fide purchaser.

In Collier, the legitimate heirs of Lou

Vander McLaurin executed oil and gas leases to Shell Oil Company. 285 Shell later
assigned an overriding royalty to Amoco Production Company, 286 Shell transferred its
interest to a subsidiary corporation. 287 Before the period for illegitimates to assert their
claims had expired, the illegitimate heirs of Lou Vanden McLaurin asserted their right to
inherit as against the legitimate heirs, Amoco and Shell.288 When the case came before the
Mississippi Supreme Court, that court began its opinion by stating that:
Interests in land are not protected as vested property rights where the
interests have been acquired by inheritance and without detrimental reliance
and no subsequent transaction has been executed. One who has acquired
title by operation of law under prior interpretation of the law regulating
descent and distribution must yield to a subsequent change of interpretation.289

The court then cited several Mississippi cases wherein illegitimate heirs were
allowed to take notwithstanding the fact that rights of inheritance had vested in legitimate
heirs.290 The court, however, noted that this case was different because the legitimate heirs
had conveyed interests in the subject property to an innocent purchaser for value. 291
In denying the illegitimate’s asserted right to inherit the court relied on Article 1
Section 10 Clause 1 of the United States Constitution stating that "the Constitution denies
to the states the power to enact any law impairing the obligation of contracts". 292 The
rights of the illegitimate were subject to the bona fide purchaser’s (Shell and Amoco)
contract rights. The court stated further:
Shell and then Amoco are bona fide purchasers for value. At the time they
took neither land records nor accessible law gave them notice that
McLaurin’s illegitimate heirs had rights in his estate. As such, Shell and
then Amoco, acquired title against the world. Indeed, we have recognized
that """"every reasonable intendm ent should be m ade to support the titles o f bona
fid e purchasers o f real property, and that no equity can be any stronger than that
o f a purchaser who has p ut him self in peril by purchasing a title fo r valuable
consideration without notice o f any defect in it". (emphasis added)
By the same token, the states’ interest in the stability of land titles is very
much at issue today. Purchasers of interests in land should not be required
at their peril to predict the future course of constitutional law. 293
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Although the Mississippi Court used Art. 1,

§ 10, Cl. 1 of the United States

Constitution to support its decision, it seems that protecting the rights of a bona fide
purchaser rests upon equitable principles. As previously indicated the Arkansas Supreme
Court has recognized the implications that could result when stale claims are presented
and the rights of innocent third parties are subject to being adversely affected.
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CONCLUSION
The law concerning the effect of illegitimacy in Arkansas has undergone some
drastic changes since the United States Supreme Court decided the Trimble case. However,
many of the principles, presumptions and rules of law that were presented in the discussion
of the recent decisions of the Arkansas Supreme Court existed prior to Trimble. It is hoped
that this article has created some interest in this area of the law since it is important for
anyone involved in land transactions be familiar with the effects that illegitimacy might
have on intestate succession and title to real property.
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